Why Ruben Amorim’s system is not working at Manchester United

 Ruben Amorim’s Manchester derby adversary Pep Guardiola once described formations as mere “telephone numbers” but rarely has a manager been so defined by a system as United’s coach.

Sunday’s 3-0 defeat at the Etihad raised more questions about United’s set-up, their use of Bruno Fernandes and an undermanned midfield.

Mason Mount playing at left wing-back against Grimsby Town was another low point and presented as evidence of Amorim being too dogmatic in his commitment to 3-4-2-1.

An uncharitable view would be that Amorim has mistaken a formation, which has no inherent significance, with a philosophy. The riposte would be that his system is simply a framework in which players can rotate and interpret the game for themselves.

Regardless, United continue to search for answers. This is why balance and consistency are proving so elusive.

Balancing control with threat

United scored fewer goals than West Ham United and Wolverhampton Wanderers in the Premier League last season while only the three relegated sides scored fewer in home matches.

Changing that sorry state of affairs was a matter of urgency in the summer, with more than £200m spent on Matheus Cunha, Bryan Mbeumo and Benjamin Sesko.

There have been encouraging signs of United feeding their new additions with early service. Diagonal passes from left to right towards Mbeumo have been a feature, notably in their opening weekend defeat by Arsenal.

Prior to the game at City, no team had produced more “direct attacks” than United’s eight.

Opta defines direct attacks as: “The number of open-play sequences that start just inside the team’s own half and have at least 50 per cent of movement towards the opposition’s goal and ends in a shot or a touch in the opposition’s box.”

Compared to other members of the “big six”, United have played the highest percentage of long passes so far. There is not necessarily a correlation between this statistic and aspiration; Bournemouth will hope to push for Europe and lead by a distance at 17.2 per cent having dismantled Tottenham Hotspur on their own patch.

However, this does raise two questions for Amorim: how do United attack deep defences when there is no space to play directly and how do they avoid becoming embroiled in basketball matches? Spells of the second half against Burnley fell into that category.

Last season, Amorim spoke about the need for greater control. There have been some interesting quirks in his system when United are building settled possession from deep, the most striking of which has been the position of the central centre-back. Here, against Arsenal, Matthijs de Ligt is in a central midfield zone.

United’s build-up play was quite effective against a disjointed Arsenal press, but this ploy has looked unconvincing in most of the games it has been tried under Amorim.

Against City, United once again tried to profit from early balls in behind and switches of play from the flanks. These passages of play yielded little reward with United’s crossing largely inaccurate. 

Burden on midfield two

“We know how they defend and we know they like to squeeze from the back five,” said Marco Silva, the Fulham head coach, after last month’s draw with United. “And if you don’t give bodies for them to squeeze from the back five you can create superiority in the middle. We know they play two in the middle. We tried to overload with our three plus Alex [Iwobi]. It was as simple as that.”

Whether you wish to refer to United’s formation as a 3-4-3, 3-4-2-1, a 3-2-5 when attacking, a 5-2-3 when pressing or a 5-4-1 when defending deep, the one constant is they play with two central midfielders.

They are placed under immense strain, and failing to add greater technical assurance and athleticism in the transfer market means last season’s problems remain. Bruno Fernandes and Kobbie Mainoo have the skill but not the legs; Casemiro and Manuel Ugarte have industry but make every touch look a chore.

United’s set-up is especially vulnerable in two phases of play. First, when their back five is pinned deep by an opposition front three, leaving the midfield pair to cover the width of the pitch in front. Covering switches of play against a team with a winger and a full-back on each side can be exhausting work. As Silva explained, opponents can also have players stepping into or rolling off the defence into the spaces either side of the midfield two.

Secondly, when United are pressing higher up the pitch and their front three is bypassed, it can leave the midfield two with Hobson’s choice. Do they press the player on the ball and leave a player free between the lines, relying on a defender to jump, or back away and let the opposition midfielder carry unopposed?

In this example against Fulham, the ball being played beyond United’s front three into Sander Berge is the trigger for left winger Iwobi to drift into a No 10 position. Casemiro can neither track Iwobi or apply sufficient pressure on the ball, and Fulham are through United’s midfield in one pass. Out of picture, Fulham left-back Antonee Robinson is pushed on, meaning a front four is pinning United’s back five. That is how Silva’s three-against-two overload is created.

Against Arsenal, United initially did well to force their opponents back to the goalkeeper. However, as they try to keep man-to-man pressure on the ball with Fernandes following Martin Odegaard, note the chasm that has opened up between the Portuguese and Casemiro.

What could have been a profitable pressing situation is neutered by William Saliba playing a pass straight into the feet of centre-forward Viktor Gyokeres, who wins a foul on the halfway line to relieve the pressure.

City’s first goal in the derby was a classic example of the problems opponents can cause United in the pockets of space around their central midfield players. Whether it was instinctive or a ploy from Guardiola, City’s usual left-winger Jeremy Doku drifted into a highly unusual attacking midfield position right of centre. Usually, one would expect Doku to hold his width on the opposite side.

His position meant City had their midfield trio of Rodri, Phil Foden, Tiajni Reijnders as well as Doku in close proximity. The higher position of Reijnders means Luke Shaw was occupied by two players – Reijnders and Doku – and so could not jump to press the latter. Doku was found by Rodri, and could to turn into space and dribble into the box.

The Fernandes conundrum

As soon as Amorim was appointed, his use of Fernandes was bound to be a point of intrigue. For most of his time at Old Trafford, United’s talisman has been a No 10 with freedom to move across the pitch, looking for killer passes and spectacular shots in his customary high-tariff style.

In Amorim’s formation, though, there is not a classical No 10 but two inside forwards who operate in the half-spaces behind the striker. In an excellent display at Anfield last season, Fernandes showed he could thrive left of centre as one of those two attacking players.

However, with United investing in Cunha and Mbeumo this summer, those positions appear filled unless there are injuries.

Amorim has moved Fernandes into a deeper midfield role. This may be one reason why United top the charts for direct attacks; having a player with Fernandes’s vision and passing range can help spring them from deep at pace.

Fernandes’s heat map so far this season compared to the last three Premier League campaigns shows that, for the first time, the most-concentrated zone for touches are inside his own half.

Fernandes is not a natural central midfielder out of possession though, which only serves to highlight the deficiencies of his partners. Perhaps Carlos Baleba would help, but United may need two Carlos Balebas.

In the Manchester derby, Amorim eventually moved Fernandes into a more advanced position once Casemiro and Kobbie Mainoo were on the pitch.

Unproductive wing-backs

Amorim could rightly point out that United’s attacking shape is not that different positionally to many of the top teams in Europe who start with a back four but roll into a 3-2-5. Filling the “five attacking lanes” has become ubiquitous.

The difference of course, is that those sides will have attackers on the outside of their front five. Amorim has generally been asking full-backs to push forward. This is why formations are not necessarily that important; two teams can be identical positionally, but look very different because of the qualitative differences between the players.

In more than 30 years of the Premier League, only two teams have won the title with a primary system of a back three and wing-backs. They were Blackburn Rovers in 1994-95, with Jason Wilcox and Stuart Ripley supplying crosses to Alan Shearer and Chris Sutton, and Antonio Conte’s Chelsea in 2016-17.

On the right, Conte converted a natural winger in Victor Moses. Marcos Alonso chipped in with goals and was a proficient free-kick taker, and the pair finished the season with a combined 14 goals and assists.

Looking across Europe’s big five leagues at teams who have won titles with a similar system to Amorim, the trend suggests his wing-backs need to be producing 15 to 20 goals and assists combined. A more defensive Juventus team in 2015-16 were the exception. Sporting’s 2023-24 champions were of course Amorim’s team.

Last season, Diogo Dalot, Luke Shaw, Patrick Dorgu and Noussair Mazraoui produced just four goals and assists between them.

One mooted solution is to use Amad Diallo, who finished last season with eight goals and six assists in the Premier League, at right wing-back. His partnership with Mbeumo could be potent, but would he offer enough defensive security against better opponents?

At City, Amorim went with Dorgu and Mazraoui, with the latter especially ineffective going forward. He is a solid full-back by trade and is another awkward fit in his structure. 

Same old defenders and the goalkeeping problem

United are relying on the same defensive group, with Lisandro Martínez nearing a return. Leny Yoro has been a ray of light, and United need more defenders of his ilk.

The best two teams in the country, Liverpool and Arsenal, have defenders who can cover large spaces and cope one-on-one. This allows them to lock on to teams man-for-man higher up the pitch and squeeze. Are the likes of De Ligt, Harry Maguire, Shaw and Martínez happy doing the same? The Argentine does not lack aggression, but is not the best mover.

This is especially important in a 3-4-3 with two central midfielders. To combat the central overload, centre-backs need to be happy following their man into midfield, staying touch tight. When Thomas Tuchel used this system to win Chelsea the Champions League, Antonio Rüdiger was exceptional in this department. United do not have enough speed or dominance to do the same.

The subject of defenders “jumping” was a theme of Fernandes’ post-match interview after the Manchester derby, when he went into a surprising amount of tactical detail.

“We need to be more brave with full pressure in one against one,” United’s captain said. “City take that risk against us, we need to do the same. 

“I was trying to press Rodri because the aim of the midfielders is for one to jump on Rodri, one of the defenders on Foden. In the first moment, I can cover both but Leny [Yoro] comes up so I go more on Rodri. And Leny was going backwards because of a miscommunication we end up giving too much space on the pitch. 

“When we go, we have to take more risks and we have to be more brave with the last line.”

Not much analysis is required of the goalkeeping situation, with André Onana in Turkey and Altay Bayindir playing a good pass one minute and chucking one in the next. Bayindir was almost caught in possession by Haaland in his six-yard box. New man Senne Lammens will surely get his chance.